Squatters and vacant property in Kentucky: what the law says

1 · KRS 512.010 — definitions for KRS Chapter 512, incl. (6) "Squatter" (added by 2025 Ky. Acts ch. 63 [HB 10], sec. 2, eff. 2025-06-27)

READ THE SCOPE, THEN READ THE PROVISOS. SCOPE: the section opens "As used in this chapter" — KRS Chapter 512 is criminal damage to property (criminal mischief, littering). This definition governs that chapter. It is not a provision of Kentucky’s landlord-tenant law, which is KRS 383.505 et seq., and we do not quote that here because we have not read it to the standard the rest of this page is held to. PROVISOS: a current or former tenant, anyone who ever had an agreement to occupy, and an immediate family member are all OUTSIDE this definition. The ellipsis stands for subsections (1) through (5), which define "lease or rental agreement", "litter", "noxious substance", "property" and "residential rental property".

2 · KRS 383.290(9) — who the fast procedure may not be used on

A PERSON HOLDING OUT A LEASE IS ASSERTING EXACTLY THIS. The statute says the procedure shall not be enforced against a former tenant; it does not say who decides, on the doorstep, whether the person holding out a lease is one. We looked for a provision resolving that and found none, and we will not fill the gap with a guess.

1 · KRS 383.290(5)(b) — officer remains to keep the peace (eff. 2025-06-27)

READ THE SEQUENCE, NOT THE SENTENCE. Everything in it is downstream of three earlier steps in the same section: a completed sworn petition under subsection (3), an officer verifying the petitioner’s identity under subsection (4)(a), and that officer serving a notice to immediately vacate under subsection (4)(b). The paragraph opens with the word "After". Nothing in this section gives an owner any power to remove anyone before an officer has acted.

2 · KRS 383.290(5)(c) — the owner’s immunity, and its limit

Two conditions in one sentence: "acting in good faith", and "unless the removal is found to be wrongful". Both are decided afterwards, by somebody else, about you.

3 · KRS 383.290(6) — civil cause of action for wrongful removal

The petition itself makes the owner initial a box acknowledging this: "I understand that a person or persons removed from the property pursuant to this procedure may bring a cause of action against me for any false statements made in this petition, or for wrongfully using this procedure, and that as a result of such action I may be held liable for actual damages, penalties, costs, and reasonable attorney’s fees." The action must be filed in the District Court of the county where the property is, within sixty days of the removal.

1 · KRS 511.060 — criminal trespass in the first degree (eff. 2022-07-14)

THE DEFINITION MATTERS MORE THAN THE GRADE, AND IT IS THE ONE THING NOBODY CHECKS FOR A VACANT HOUSE. KRS 511.010(2) provides: "‘Dwelling’ means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein." An empty flip mid-renovation is a "building" under KRS 511.010(1) — whether it is a "dwelling" is a question of fact about the building, and it is the question that decides which degree of trespass is in play. Second-degree criminal trespass, KRS 511.070, covers "a building" and is a Class B misdemeanor; third-degree, quoted next, covers "premises" and is a VIOLATION. The grade is not a detail here — it decides which of the statutes further down this chain applies to your case.

2 · KRS 511.080 — criminal trespass in the third degree (version effective 2026-07-15)

READ THE GRADE, BECAUSE IT REVERSES THE REST OF THE CHAIN. "Criminal trespass in the third degree is a violation" — a violation is not a misdemeanour, so the misdemeanour citation rule below (KRS 431.015(1)(a)) does not reach this offence at all. Instead KRS 511.080 is named, by number, in the two provisions after it: KRS 431.005(1)(e) and KRS 431.015(2). We read both versions of this section on the LRC’s server on 2026-07-14 — the one in force until 2026-07-15 and the one taking effect 2026-07-15 (2026 Ky. Acts ch. 67, sec. 4). Subsection (1) and the "is a violation" grading are the same in both; the incoming version adds the repeat-offence enhancement at (2)(b). We quote the incoming version because it is the one that will be in force when you read this.

3 · KRS 511.040 — burglary in the third degree (eff. 2022-07-14)

"With the intent to commit a crime" is an element the officer must have grounds to believe, and it is not supplied by the trespass itself. Kentucky’s 2025 Act does put one crime squarely in a squatter’s path: KRS 512.020(1)(d) now makes it criminal mischief in the first degree — a Class D felony — when a person, "As a squatter, intentionally or wantonly defaces, destroys, or damages real property causing pecuniary loss of five hundred dollars ($500) or more." We set the two sections side by side and draw no conclusion from the pairing.

4 · KRS 431.005(1) — arrest by peace officers (version effective 2026-07-15)

PARAGRAPH (e) IS THE ONE THAT GETS MISSED, AND WE MISSED IT OURSELVES IN AN EARLIER VERSION OF THIS PAGE. KRS 511.080 — criminal trespass in the third degree, the violation quoted above — is in that list, by number. So the statute permits a warrantless arrest for it where it is committed in the officer’s presence. We read both versions of this section on the LRC’s server on 2026-07-14: the one in force until 2026-07-15 (Acts 2019 ch. 171) and the one taking effect 2026-07-15 (2026 Ky. Acts ch. 67, sec. 8). Paragraphs (1)(a) through (1)(e), quoted here, are identical in both. We quote the incoming version because it is the one that will be in force when you read this.

5 · KRS 431.015(1)(a)–(b) — citation for misdemeanor (eff. 2025-06-27)

READ WHAT THIS RULE IS ABOUT: A MISDEMEANOR. It says a peace officer "shall issue a citation instead of making an arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his or her presence." So it reaches first-degree criminal trespass (KRS 511.060, a Class A misdemeanour) and second-degree (KRS 511.070, a Class B misdemeanour), and neither of those is on the exception list in paragraph (b) — KRS 511.050 (possession of burglar’s tools) and KRS 511.085 (domestic violence shelter trespass) are on it, and neither is the offence a squatter commits by being there. But it does NOT reach third-degree criminal trespass, because KRS 511.080 grades that a VIOLATION and not a misdemeanour. Violations are governed by the next link. A citation does not remove anyone from a house — this is the same link that killed our previous market in Ohio, and it is why we follow it all the way here.

6 · KRS 431.015(2) — citation or physical arrest for a violation (eff. 2025-06-27)

KRS 511.080 IS NAMED IN THIS SUBSECTION, BY NUMBER — the same section that KRS 431.005(1)(e) names. Both provisions carve third-degree criminal trespass out of the ordinary bar on arresting for a violation. Note the words the subsection puts around it: "committed in his or her presence". THIS IS WHERE THE PROVISIONS ON THIS PAGE STOP AGREEING WITH EACH OTHER, and that is not something we are going to tidy up for you — the citation rule above and these two arrest provisions reach different degrees of the same offence, and which degree an officer charges is his call at the door.

7 · KRS 383.290(4)(d) — arrest during service of the notice to vacate

THESE ARE THE PROVISIONS, IN ORDER. WE HAVE DRAWN NO CONCLUSION FROM THEM — that is not ours to draw, and this is the single most important question on the page. What we can say is what they do NOT do: they do not all point the same way. KRS 431.015(1)(a) is mandatory ("shall issue a citation"), opens "KRS 431.005 to the contrary notwithstanding", and speaks only of a MISDEMEANOR. KRS 431.005(1)(e) and KRS 431.015(2) each permit an arrest for third-degree criminal trespass, which is a VIOLATION, naming KRS 511.080 by number. KRS 383.290(4)(d) is permissive ("may arrest… If appropriate"). Which of them governs your case depends on which degree is charged, and that is a question for a Kentucky lawyer.

1 · KRS 383.290(4)(a)–(b) — what the officer checks before putting the owner back in possession

READ THE TWO PARAGRAPHS IN SEQUENCE. The condition in (b) is "If the identity of the petitioner is verified" — identity, the same word as in (a). A photo ID establishes who a person is. It is not evidence about who owns a building, and the statute does not say that it is.

2 · KRS 383.290(3) — the Petition to Remove Persons Unlawfully Occupying Real Property

A CLAIM ABOUT OUR OWN SEARCH, NOT ABOUT THE LAW: on 2026-07-14 we read KRS 383.290 in full, in both the codified text on the LRC’s server and the enrolled text of 2025 Ky. Acts ch. 63 (HB 10). We looked for any provision telling an officer, a sheriff, a constable or anyone else how to establish that the person who signed the petition actually owns the building — a deed check, a property valuation administrator’s lookup, a recorded-instrument search, anything. We found no such provision. The ellipsis above stands for boxes 4 through 10 of the petition; box 2 asks for the date title was obtained and asks for no evidence of it. Confirm against the official statute before relying on this.

1 · KRS 383.290(2) — 2025 Ky. Acts ch. 63 (HB 10), sec. 1, eff. 2025-06-27

Quoted from the enrolled Act as passed, fetched from the Legislative Research Commission’s own Acts archive, and cross-read against the codified text of KRS 383.290. Note condition (e): litigation you have already started against the occupant closes this route.

2 · KRS 383.290(9) — who the procedure may not be used on

THIS IS THE SENTENCE A FORGED LEASE IS AIMED AT. The statute says the procedure shall not be enforced against a former tenant; it does not say who decides, on the doorstep, whether the person holding out a lease is one. We looked for a provision resolving that and found none, and we will not fill the gap with a guess.

3 · KRS 383.210(1) — forcible entry and detainer: issual and form of warrant

The ellipsis stands for the statutory form of the warrant, which is set out verbatim in the section. Subsection (2) provides that if neither party demands a jury the trial is by the court. Kentucky’s definitions of what this action reaches are in KRS 383.200 — including, at (2)(a), that "A forcible entry is: (a) An entry without the consent of the person having the actual possession."

4 · KRS 383.245 — proceedings upon failure to file appeal; warrant of restitution

The ellipsis stands for the statutory form of the warrant of restitution, which is set out verbatim in the section and commands the sheriff or constable to "put the said A B in the possession of said premises". The seven-day appeal window is at KRS 383.255(1); perfecting an appeal stays all further proceedings on the inquisition.

1 · KRS 383.290(4)(b) — service of the notice to immediately vacate

The statute sets no outer limit on "without unnecessary delay" and defines nothing about it. Service may be by hand delivery to an occupant or by posting the notice on the property — KRS 383.290(4)(c).

2 · KRS 383.290(5)(a) — fee for service of the notice

THIS IS THE ONLY DOLLAR FIGURE ON THIS PAGE, and it is here only because the General Assembly put it inside the statute. It covers service of the notice and nothing else. Kentucky District Court filing fees, sheriff’s fees on a forcible entry and detainer, and any lawyer are all set outside the statute, and no figure for any of them appears here — every fee figure on this site appears verbatim in a document we fetched, or it does not appear.

3 · KRS 383.290(6)(b)–(c) — where and when a wrongful-removal action is brought

The fast lane is fast for you and slow for them, and the statute is honest about the trade: the occupant gets no hearing before being put out, so their remedy is a lawsuit afterwards, and a prevailing plaintiff collects court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees from you. Your own separate claim against them for damage and lost use is preserved by KRS 383.290(7).

1 · KRS 383.290(1)(b), (3) — 2025 Ky. Acts ch. 63 (HB 10), sec. 1, eff. 2025-06-27

Quoted from the enrolled Act, fetched from the Legislative Research Commission’s Acts archive, and cross-read against the codified text of KRS 383.290. The ellipsis joins subsection (1)(b) to subsection (3); nothing between them qualifies either. Note what is NOT in this statute: no judge, no magistrate, no hearing before removal, and no counter-affidavit — the occupant has no document he can hand back to stop it. What he has is KRS 383.290(9), which says the procedure "shall not be enforced against" a current or former tenant.

2 · KRS 383.290(4)(a) — the officer verifies the petitioner’s identity

The officer is also given immunity for acting on it: "A law enforcement officer acting in good faith under this subsection shall be immune from criminal and civil liability" — KRS 383.290(4)(e). The risk of the petition being false sits with the petitioner, and with the person put out of the house.

3 · KRS 383.290(9) — who the procedure may not be used on

THIS IS THE SENTENCE A FORGED LEASE IS AIMED AT, and it is why "no judge" is not the whole answer to this question. Kentucky gave owners a route around the court and then wrote a sentence that switches it off for anyone who asserts a tenancy. The statute does not say who decides, on the doorstep, whether the person holding out a lease is a former tenant. We looked for a provision resolving that and found none.

1 · KRS 413.010 — action for recovery of real property; fifteen year limitation

A CLAIM ABOUT OUR OWN SEARCH: the statute states the fifteen years and nothing else. Kentucky courts require an occupier to prove considerably more than the passage of time — the elements Kentucky lawyers recite are judicial, not statutory. We do not quote them, because we could not read the controlling opinions to the standard the rest of this page is held to, and we do not put words in a court’s mouth. Do not read the bare fifteen years as the whole rule; ask a Kentucky lawyer what the elements are.

2 · KRS 413.060(1) — person holding land under adverse title for seven years

READ THE CONDITIONS, NOT THE NUMBER. This seven-year section is narrow: it requires "a connected title thereto in law or equity, deducible of record from the Commonwealth" and an "actual occupancy of it by settlement thereon, under such title". It is not the clock a person who simply walked into an empty house is running. Subsection (2) extends it for an occupier who was an infant, of unsound mind, or out of the United States in government employment when the cause of action accrued.